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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the new Standing Orders which have been revised in anticipation of the 
adoption of the MMP electoral system and New Zealand's first election under that system in 
October 1996. In particular, the paper focuses on the Standing Orders as they apply to the 
legislative process, with emphasis on the select committee stage and the opportunities for 
opposition parties to make a valuable contribution to that process. The anticipated impacts of 
MMP on the membership of the House and the composition of government are described and 
against that background the Standing Orders relevant to the legislative process, and select 
committees, in particular, are analysed. 
The main themes of the new Standing Orders are identified as proportionality of membership 
and speaking opportunities in the House, and the promotion of consensus decision-making, 
thus furthering the trend to open government. 
The paper identifies the relationship between party discipline and select committees as crucial 
to the effectiveness of the select committee stage of the legislative process. In addressing that 
relationship, the paper draws on and discusses research undertaken by the Standing Orders 
Select Committee into proportional representation systems in Europe (including Ireland) and 
Scandinavia, and considers other research undertaken in respect of Germany, the United 
States, and Ireland. New Zealand's political culture is considered in the light of this research. 
A number of factors identified indicate that select committees will become more independent 
and powerful, while caucuses are likely to be influenced by their members to a greater extent 
than in the past. Select committees are likely to develop as the fora for inter party negotiations. 
The implications of this outcome for the legislative process are likely to be -
• a slower process and therefore less legislation overall; 
• greater use by governments of its prerogative powers as an alternative to legislation; 
• a small increase in the number of members' Bills successfully enacted; 
• more care taken by governments in characterising matters as confidence matters. 
IV 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and appendix) 
comprises approximately 14,800 words . 
Opportunities for opposition parties to influence the 
legislative process, with emphasis on the select 
committee stage 
INTRODUCTION 
On 12 October 1996, New Zealand will, for the first time, elect its government 
on the basis of mixed member proportional representation (MMP). The 
prevailing view is that a government elected under this system is more likely to 
be a minority (coalition or single party) or coalition majority government than it 
is to be a single party majority government. Initially, there may be a greater 
number of parties represented in Parliament, but the threshold
1 will keep out the 
smallest parties and a process of realignment may take place so that in due 
course there may not be more parties represented in the House than there are at 
present.2 In anticipation of the expected change in New Zealand's political 
environment, the Standing Orders Committee of the House of Representatives 
has substantially revised the Standing Orders, which until the revision, reflected 
the two-party political system to which New Zealand is accustomed. 
Under the new Standing Orders and MMP it can be expected that all members 
of Parliament will be influential in what legislation is enacted and on the final 
shape of government policy, as the government will probably not be in a 
position to guarantee the passage of its legislation in the form it desires without 
the support of other parties. In that context the Standing Orders anticipate the 
Section 191 ( 4) Electoral Act 1993: A party must achieve at least 5% of the party vote in order to 
qualify for any seats in Parliament, unless that party wins a constituency seat. 
J Boston, S Levine, E McLeay & N Roberts New Zealand Under MMP - A New Politics? (Auckland 
University Press with Bridget Williams Books, Auckland, 1996) 61. There are currently (ie as at 
September 1996) seven parties represented in Parliament: National, United, Labour, the Alliance, New 
Zealand First, the Christian Democrats, and the Conservative Party. There is also one independent 
member. 
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need for government decisions to be arrived at after consultation and, if 
possible, by consensus. 
The new electoral system and the revised Standing Orders combine to provide 
opposition parties and individual members with new and enhanced opportunities 
to influence the legislative process and therefore the legislative output - Acts of 
Parliament. The greatest opportunities will arise in the select committee stage of 
the process and this paper looks in particular detail at that stage. 
Of crucial importance to the effectiveness of opposition parties in influencing 
the legislative process during the select committee stage will be the relationship 
between party discipline as exercised by party caucuses and the development of 
strong and · independent select committees. This paper explores the relationship 
between strong party discipline and independent select committees, and 
considers how that relationship may change under MMP. 
Part II of this paper sets out the likely impacts of the change to MMP on 
membership of the House and the type of government that is likely. It is 
anticipated that Parliament will be more representative of the various views of 
the electorate and that a multi-party Parliament will provide an incentive for 
parties to negotiate to achieve their objectives in the House and its committees. 
There will be more parties represented in the House than has been usual in New 
Zealand and therefore those parties are likely to be smaller with correspondingly 
smaller party caucuses. There will also be more members and therefore a larger 
pool of talent from which to select Ministers. 
Part III introduces the new Standing Orders and briefly describes the two 
principles upon which they are based, namely proportionality and the 
encouragement of consensus decision-making. 
Part IV describes and analyses the legislative process for government Bills as set 
out in the Standing Orders. In particular, this analysis considers the Standing 
Orders from the perspective of the influence opposition parties could have on 
the process through the specific recognition of parties in accordance with their 
size in the House relative to other parties and the effect on the opposition 
parties of the development of consensus decision-making. 
In Part V the select committee stage of the legislative process is addressed in 
greater detail and opportunities for opposition members to influence the process 
at this stage are identified. 
Part VI considers the relationship between party caucuses and select 
committees, both pre- and post the adoption of MMP. This evaluation suggests 
that select committees may become stronger and more independent while 
caucuses will continue to have a role, but rather than influencing select 
committees caucuses are more likely to be influenced by them. 
In Part VII the possible implications for the legislative process of more effective 
opposition parties and members, and strong committees are considered. One 
possible implication is that members' Bills will have a greater chance of success, 
although this will depend on resources being made available to opposition 
members to enable their measures to be competently drafted and rigorously 
developed from a policy perspective. 
Part VIII summanses the prerequisites for effective participation m the 
legisfative process by opposition parties. The conclusions drawn are set out in 
Part IX. 
,.., 
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II THE IMPACT OF MMP 
A The Changes to Membership of the House 
McLeay and Harris identify three important changes to the membership of the 
House of Representatives flowing from :MMP, which will affect how the House 
carries out its functions. 3 These three changes are: 
1. The election of party list members who are likely be drawn from across the 
board. They can be expected to express a variety of views, representative of 
those of the country; 
2. The change from the two-party system to a multi-party system; and 
3. The different composition of the Government, that is, that it will very likely be a 
minority government (single party or coalition) or a majority coalition 
government. 
In addition to these three changes, there will also be more members in the 
House, about 120 in total. 
The election of party list members of Parliament can be expected to result in a 
wider range of views being represented in the House, as parties recognise the 
advantage in placing individuals who may appeal to minority or under-
represented groups high on their lists. Lists can be used to address the 
imbalance of gender and ethnicity and to provide for the election of people with 
expertise in useful areas who might otherwise not appeal to the constituency. 
List members, in theory, may be more able to devote themselves to 
parliamentary work since they will not have the demands of a constituency. 
However, their parties may require them to share the constituency work with 
electorate members, both to raise or maintain their public profiles and to make 
electorate members available for other duties. In particular, electorates 
represented by Ministers would benefit from the involvement of other members. 
Paul Harris and Elizabeth McLeay "The Legislature" in GR Hawke (ed) Changing Politics? The 
Electoral Referendum 1993 (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1993) 103. 
6 
The dynamics of multi-party politics will be different from that of two-party 
politics. The traditional New Zealand political culture is one of confrontation, 
which is commonly associated with majoritarian (effectively two-party) 
systems. 4 In such systems the policies of the two dominant parties tend to differ 
along only one dimension, for example socio-economic policy. 
5 In a multi-party 
system there tend to be differences among the parties along multiple dimensions, 
such as religion, race or culture. In an MMP Parliament, more than the two 
main parties may be effectively represented and, where this is so, there is a 
greater need for parties to negotiate in order for a government to be formed and 
policies to be implemented. 
This need to negotiate may lead to the development of the much vaunted 
"culture of consensus" in the House. It appears that this is already developing in 
the present quasi-MMP period as the Government, reliant as it is on the support 
of the United Party, has had to consult with other parties to ensure that its 
legislation is enacted. 6 However, some current members are sceptical, for 
example, David Caygill commented in the debate on the Standing Orders that 
"[t]here is no greater myth about MMP than that it will lead to a kinder, gentler, 
nicer, more harmonious House."7 
With more parties represented in the House, it is likely that, proportional to the 
size of the House, each party so represented will be smaller than in the past. 
This will mean that there will also be more party caucuses and that they also will 
be smaller than formerly. 
There will be approximately twenty more members in the House after the 
election on 12 October 1996 than is currently the case. The Electoral Act 1993, 
SE Finer argues that "adversary politics is the fruit of the two-party system". SE Finer (ed) Preface to 
Adversary Politics and Electoral Reforms (Anthony Wigram, London, 1975) 3. 
A Lijphart "Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes and Consequences" Journal of 
Theoretical Politics Vol 1 1989 pp 33 - 48, 36 as cited by Harris and McLeay. Seen 3 above, 104. 
"Nine to Noon" Public Radio Broadcast 20 August 1996, transcript of interview with Sir Geoffrey 
Palmer by Kim Hill, 4. 
(1995) 552 NZPD 10829. 
5 
6 
which implements the decision to adopt MMP, provides for the increase in the 
number of members from 99 to approximately 120. The Royal Commission on 
Electoral Reform was of the view that MMP would not be practical with the 
existing number of members. 8 This increase should provide a larger pool from 
which Cabinet can be appointed, provided the size of Cabinet is not increased 
commensurately.9 Assuming the number of executive members is not increased, 
there will be more members available to sit on select committees; and a larger 
pool of potential select committee chairpersons, party spokespersons and whips. 
There will be an infusion of new blood into Parliament at the next election due 
to the increase in the number of members and the introduction of party lists, as 
well as the retirement of a relatively large number of sitting members. 10 New 
members may have less entrenched attitudes and may be more prepared to work 
towards consensus government, especially as some of them will owe their seats 
to the new system. 
B Coalition or Minority Government? 
According to Dodd, 11 the ideal type of government likely to eventuate under 
MMP is the "minimum winning coalition", that being a coalition just big enough 
to ensure a parliamentary majority and containing no party that is not essential 
to the achievement of a majority. The larger a winning coalition is, the more 
likely it is that party discipline will be a problem. A minimum winning coalition 
is ideal in the sense that it is most likely to produce a relatively durable cabinet. 
Failing a minimum winning coalition, for reasons such as ideological 
incompatibility, there may be a single party minority government or there may 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral System Towards a Better Democracy [1986] AJHR 
H.3, 43. 
9 Jackson argues that it is not clear that increasing the number of members of Parliament will of itself 
strengthen the select committee system. He agrees that increasing the number would supply a bigger 
pool of talent but argues that this advantage would be lost if the committees and Cabinet increased in 
size. He suggests a smaller Executive in a larger House: "Electoral Reform: An Academic Perspective" 
Legislative Studies Vol 3 No 1 Autumn 1988, 12, 15. 
10 Among them are former Labour Prime Minister David Lange, and a number offom1er Ministers. 
11 Lawrence C Dodd Coalitions in Parliamentary Government (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1976) 12-16. 
be a majority coalition which is not rrurumum wmrung, but is what Dodd 
describes as oversized. If the opposition parties are also unable to unite, a 
minority may be able to govern successfully. 
Minority government means that the government may be out-voted in the 
House and will be in a minority on the powerful Business Committee and in 
select committees overall. A minority government will not be able to govern 
unless it is able to gain the support of enough other members or parties to 
ensure its confidence measures are enacted. 
Yet, even if a party succeeds in forming a single party government for one term 
of Parliament, it may not necessarily succeed in doing so the following term and 
will need to keep in mind the possibility of forming a coalition. This is likely to 
affect the type and manner of expression of its policies so that it does not 
preclude coalition with preferred parties. 
12 
New Zealand has been regarded as a fairly extreme example of the Westminster 
system of government. 
13 According to Strnm, such systems incline towards 
single party minority governments rather than majority coalitions when their 
two-party systems disintegrate.
14 It does not appear likely that the New 
Zealand system will behave in this way as New Zealand already has a coalition 
government in exactly the situation where Strnm would predict a single party 
minority government. 
12 Harris and McLeay, above n 3, 103. 
13 Arend Lijphart Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Govern111ent in Twenty-one 
Countries (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn, 1984) 16-19; Matthew SR Palmer "Collecti\'e 
Cabinet Decision-making in New Zealand" in Michael Laver and Kenneth A Shepsle (eds) Cabinet 
Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994) 226. 
14 K Strnm Minority Govern111ent and Majority Rule (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990) 
cited in Harris and McLeay, above n 3, 106. 
7 
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Ill THE NEW STANDING ORDERS
15 
The Standing Orders are Parliament's basic code of rules of procedure, adopted 
by the House itself 16 The new Standing Orders have been adopted in 
anticipation of the first MMP election and the report of the Standing Orders 
Committee acknowledges that changes may be required once the Standing 
Orders have been in use for a period. Indeed, the Standing Orders Committee 
reported again in August 1996 and a number of changes were made prior to the 
House rising for the election. 
17 Some changes recommended by the Committee 
will require legislation and others, the development of conventions. 
Acknowledging that MMP means a more important role for opposition parties, 
the new Standing Orders are based on two principles: proportionality in the 
membership of committees and allocation of speaking opportunities; and the 
need to achieve consensus wherever possible. This second principle entails the 
provision, on a timely basis, of adequate information to members, and genuine 
consultation with members of all political parties represented in the House. The 
Standing Orders Committee itself currently reaches its decisions by consensus. 
On their own Standing Orders provide for a fairer distribution of speaking times 
and representation on select committees, however, if one party achieves an 
outright majority at an election, that party will still outnumber the other 
members on select committees and be allotted most of the speaking time. 
Opposition parties will not be in a position to make or break a government, 
negotiate the amendment of legislation to moderate government policy, nor will 
their scrutiny be as effective. To this extent it should be noted that the changes 
to Standing Orders reflect more than the coming change in the electoral system. 
15 Report of the Standing Orders Committee on the Review of Standing Orders [1995] AJHR I.18A. 
16 David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2 ed GP Publications Ltd ,Wellington, 1994) 
81. 
17 Report of the Standing Orders Committee on its Review of the Operation of the Standing Orders 
[1996] AJHR 1.18B. 
Some changes have been mooted for some time and would have been desirable 
improvements even ifMMP had not been adopted. 
Although New Zealand's system of MMP is modelled on the German system, 
the Standing Orders Committee did not recommend the adoption of a rule 
similar to Germany's "constructive vote of no confidence", whereby the 
opposition may move a vote of no confidence in the current Chancellor only if it 
is able to propose, by an absolute majority, the name of a person it would 
support as Chancellor. In New Zealand, it is unclear whether or not the 
Governor-General must grant a dissolution of Parliament to a Prime Minister 
who has lost the confidence of the House, and if a dissolution is not required, 
how the Governor-General is to determine whether an alternative government 
can be formed. 18 New Zealand has no experience of how to deal with a 
government falling during its term, but it is more likely to occur under 
proportional representation. 
19 The German rule is conducive to greater stability 
as it would enable the government to continue in office even if the opposition 
parties managed to unite and pass a motion of no confidence, provided that they 
could not agree on who should form the next government. 
The position as to dissolution is clearer in Germany, where the Chancellor may 
move a positive vote of confidence which, if lost, enables him or her to secure a 
dissolution of the Bundestag, unless the Bundestag is able to elect a successor 
to the Chancellor before the dissolution takes effect 21 days after the motion is 
passed. In New Zealand the convention has been for a government to continue 
in office until it loses a vote of no confidence. "Negative parliamentarianism", 
such as the New Zealand system, tends to be associated with minority 
government. 20 
18 State Services Commission Working under Proportional Representation: a reference for the Public 
Service (Wellington, 1995) 89. 
19 State Services Commission, above n 18, 96. 
2° Kaare Strom, Ian Budge & Michael Laver "Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary 
Democracies" American Journal of Political Science Vo! 38 No 2 May 1994, 303, 320. See also 
Boston et al, above n 2 , 100. 
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IV THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS-GOVERNMENT BILLS 
A Brief Overview of the Legislative Procesl1 
Prior to the revision of Standing Orders, Bills were introduced, debated at the 
first reading and referred to a select committee. The first reading debate 
provided no real opportunity for a useful contribution from the opposition 
members as few, if any, were likely to have seen a copy of the Bill prior to 
introduction. 
Under the new Standing Orders all Bills, with the usual exceptions of money 
Bills and Bills accorded urgency, will be referred to a select committee for 
consideration following the second reading.22 The committee of the whole 
House stage will follow the debate on the select committee report, unless that 
stage has been dispensed with. Prior to 1996, all Bills were required to go 
through the committee of the whole House stage, except with leave of the 
House where there were no amendments to be moved. Now, however, the 
Business Committee may decide that the Bill does not require consideration in 
committee, in which case the Bill is set down for its third reading.23 
In the committee of the whole House, Bills are generally examined clause by 
clause. This provides opportunities for technical amendments to improve the 
quality of Bills, and supplementary order papers may introduce amendments at 
this stage. However, as a time-saving device the government has often moved 
for a Bill to be considered part by part instead. This has the disadvantage of 
curtailing the detailed scrutiny of each clause and the quality of a Bill may suffer 
as a result. It is now within the power of the Business Committee to determine 
whether a Bill should be debated part by part at the committee stage rather than 
requiring a motion of the House. Both the taking of a Bill part by part and the 
21 The Appendix to this paper compares the legislative process as it was prior to 1996, with that provided 
for in the new Standing Orders. 
22 Standing Order 279. 
23 Standing Order 291(2). 
i 
decision of the Business Committee to dispense with the committee stage 
altogether may have serious consequences for legislation depending on the 
criteria upon which such decisions are based. The Business Committee could 
decide to omit the committee stage of a non-contentious Bill even though it is a 
complex and important piece of legislation, thus robbing such legislation of the 
benefits of the detailed scrutiny of the House in committee. 
Following the committee of the whole stage the Bill will be read a third time. 
The final stage of the legislative process is the endorsement on the Bill of the 
Royal Assent by the Governor-General. 
B The Pre-introduction! -legislative Stage 
Traditionally, government proposals for legislation were developed with the 
assistance of departmental officials, who would sometimes be authorised to 
consult with outside groups or individuals. The actual legislative programme 
was and still is confidential to the government.
24 The Cabinet Office Manual 
sets out the basic process for the development of government legislation from 
the policy stage through to enactment. This process involves consultation 
within government circles as a matter of course, and may involve wider 
consultation where the appropriate Minister directs or approves such 
consultation. The Cabinet Office Manual does not specifically address 
consultation with opposition parties, although it envisages that it will be 
necessary for the government to consult with other political parties to the extent 
that that is necessary to ensure sufficient support for its legislation.
25 
Early consultation by a minority government with opposition parties would help 
build support for government proposals and be a further advance on the trend 
for major reforms to be preceded by the publication of discussion papers and 
the canvassing of views of key interest groups. To the extent that opposition 
2
•
1 See the recently revised Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, August 1996) para 5.6. 
25 Cabinet Office Manual, above n 24, paras 5.34 -5.36. 
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parties can put forward their views in a non-adversarial context and before the 
government has publicly committed itself to a draft Bill, they are more likely to 
influence the policy reflected in the Bill. On the other hand it may be easier for 
the government to enter into negotiations with other parties once it has a draft 
Bill which sets out its starting position. If this should be the way the process 
develops, it may be in the interest of better quality legislation to involve select 
committees before the Bill is introduced to consider the policy and its 
formulation without being hampered by the outcome of the second reading 
debate on the purpose and principles of the Bill, and before the government has 
become publicly committed to the Bill. 26 
A pre-legislative stage involving select committee consideration of legislative 
proposals would help to ensure that the policy behind legislative proposals and 
the detail of those proposals was adequately worked through before 
introduction. 27 This in turn would mean that members of the public who make 
submissions would do so on the basis of a Bill which fairly represents 
government policy. There is nothing in the Standing Orders which would 
preclude select committees from considering policy issues before legislation is 
drafted, and there has been at least one occasion when this has occurred. 28 
In Ireland there is no formal pre-legislative consultation with the opposition 
parties prior to the introduction of a Bill. There is scope, however, for the Joint 
Committee on Legislation to undertake an information-gathering exercise to 
establish the views of interested parties. The members on the committee can 
contribute their own ideas on the proposed legislation through their choice of 
26 Geoff Skene New Zealand Parliamentary Committees: An Analysis (Institute of Policy Studies, 
Wellington, 1990) 12. Burrows argues that there is no evidence that the adoption of pre-legislative 
involvement of select committees would make any difference: JF Burrows Statute Lmv in New Zealand 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 42 . 
27 There has been a tendency in recent years for governments to introduce legislation which has not been 
given sufficient attention prior to introduction in the belief that select committees and Parliamentary 
Counsel would remedy any problems. 
28 Keith Jackson The Dilemma of Parliament (Allen & Unwin NZ Ltd and Port Nicholson Press, 
Wellington, 1987) 97-99. The Public Finance Bill 1977 was referred to the Public E>qx:nditurc 
Committee. Jackson sees the failure of governments to use this procedure as reflecting the 
determination of those governments not to relinquish their tight grip upon legislation and implying the 
jealously guarded dominance of the House over its committees. 
questions and selection of witnesses. The Committee makes its contribution 
before a Bill has been drafted. The expectation was that only 3 to 5 Bills per 
year would warrant such treatment and they would be the most significant and 
controversial measures.29 Since March 1995, some Irish committees have been 
empowered to discuss and draft proposals for legislative change. 
30 
It is established practice m Germany for all draft Bills to be submitted to 
members of the Bundestag. The members and the Fraktionen (the parties) 
provide comments on the draft Bills to the ministries. A consequence of this 
practice is the smoothing of the path of Bills through the Bundestag and its 
committees. 31 
There would be some merit in a formal pre-legislative procedure being used in 
New Zealand more frequently than has been the case, although consultation at 
the pre-legislative stage is developing. Palmer has commented that there has 
been little legislation introduced in 1996 which wasn't agreed in advance.
32 
C Urgency and Extraordinary Urgency 
A Minister may move, without notice, a motion to accord urgency to certain 
business. There will be no amendment or debate on the question but the 
Minister must explain to the House "with some particularity" why the motion is 
being moved. 33 
Although in the past urgency has been used to avoid the scrutiny of the House, 
there has been no great abuse of the urgency provisions recently as the 
29 David Gwynn Morgan Constitutional Law of Ireland (2 edn The Round Hall Press, Dublin, 1990) 98. 
30 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 263. 
31 Tony Burkett "Developments in the West German Bundestag 1969-80" (1981) 34 Parliamentary 
Affairs 291 , 304. 
32 Palmer, above n 6, 5. 
33 Standing Order 56. 
13 
14 
Government has not had the numbers to enable it to do so. 34 However, the 
Standing Orders Committee saw the need to discourage the taking of urgency. 
Previously, urgency allowed a Bill to proceed through all stages of enactment at 
the one sitting of Parliament. Now, however, urgency sitting hours will not 
commence until the day following that on which the motion for urgency has 
been agreed. 35 The taking of urgency disadvantages the opposition parties as 
they will not usually have an up-to-date copy of the Bill being debated. 
The new rules as to urgency operate to restrain the government in its efforts to 
bypass the standard legislative procedure and thereby deny opposition parties 
their opportunity to debate the proposed legislation fully and scrutinise it in 
select committee. Under extraordinary urgency the sitting at which the motion 
is agreed is extended to accommodate the business, but the Speaker must be 
satisfied that the business warrants the taking of extraordinary urgency. 36 
D First and Second Reading 
The Standing Orders Committee recognised the futility of a first reading debate 
as opposition members had little information upon which to base a useful 
contribution and recommended that the debate on first reading be dispensed 
with. 37 Instead, there is provision for a second reading debate prior to the Bill 
being referred to select committee. By the time of the second reading, which 
can take place no sooner than three sitting days after introduction unless the 
Business Committee determines otherwise, all members should have a copy of 
the Bill and have had the opportunity to read and consider it. However, three 
days is still a very short period in which to read and digest some of the very 
34 The Maori Reserved Land Bill was introduced and referred directly to a select corrunittee in the last 
days of the 44th Parliament, with the agreement of Labour. It will have its second reading on its return 
to the House. 
35 Standing Order 57 . 
36 Standing Order 58. 
37 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 53. 
complex legislative proposals introduced into the House. In fact, because the 
House sits only three days per week in normal circumstances it is more likely 
that there will be a full week between introduction and second reading. 
38 In 
order to cope with the demand for a quick assessment of Bills, there would be 
value in parties assigning responsibility for particular areas to specific members 
who would then have the task of briefing the party caucus on a legislative 
proposal within that subject area. 
To assist members the explanatory note attached to the introduction copy of a 
Bill is to provide more than just the technical information it has contained in the 
past. Departmental officials will now draft the explanatory notes of Bills 
providing discussion of the policy the Bill is intended to implement and matters 
which the Bill is intended to remedy. The new Standing Orders do not 
specifically address this matter, but the Standing Orders Committee 
recommended this course of action in its report. 
39 
E Debates 
In the past, the government has been able to pass whatever legislation it wished 
despite the best efforts of the opposition. This was because it controlled a 
majority in the House. As a consequence, the power of the opposition was to 
delay and embarrass, but, in the future, if the government is in a minority and/or 
dependent on holding a coalition together, the opposition may actually defeat 
. government Bills or succeed with its own.
40 Before the adoption of MMP, this 
would have put pressure on the government to make sure that it was adequately 
represented in the House when Bills of significance to it were being debated. 
The challenge for a minority government will now be to build support for its 
38 For example, for a Bill introduced on a Tuesday, the third sitting day following will be the next 
Tuesday. 
39 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 54. It appears that this recommendation has already found its 
mark as a number of government Bills have included the new expanded ex'J)lanatory note. 
4° For example, the Education Amendment Act 1996 promoted by Trevor Mallard was enacted in the face 
of government opposition, a reversal of roles which saw an acrimonious exchange in the House 
between Mr Mallard and the chairman of the select committee, Ian Revell : (1996) 555 NZPD from 
13034. 
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important measures. With the advent of proxy voting, the actual numbers in the 
House will be less important to the outcome. The provisions for proxy voting 
allow for a member of one party to give his or her vote to another party, but 
they must do so explicitly as, in the absence of a member from the House, that 
member's party may cast his or her proxy vote without specific instructions.41 
Members may now abstain from voting altogether as, where there are a number 
of parties in the House, there are more likely to be occasions upon which a 
party or member is neither in favour of, nor opposed to, a particular measure. 42 
In terms of managing debates, the Business Committee plays the major role. It 
may decide the amount of time to be devoted to particular debates and how that 
time should be divided up, that is, the number and length of speeches to be 
4' accommodated. ~ 
Not all Bills are confidence issues and the defeat of a government Bill will not 
necessarily cause more than loss of face to the government. Indeed the 
government may become less concerned about being defeated on minor 
measures. As this happens, government caucuses may become more selective 
about the measures upon which they insist on their members toeing the party 
line. Likewise opposition parties and their caucuses may become more tolerant 
of departures from the party line on a wider range of issues than formerly. 
F Referral to Select Committee 
The second reading debate on the purpose and principles of the Bill effectively 
sets the terms of reference of the select committee. Following the debate the 
See sessional order varying Standing Orders 21 February 1996 in Parliamentary Bulletin 96.01. The 
sessional order provided for the Leader of the party or the senior party whip to exercise the prox'Y vote 
of each member of the party subject to any exl)ress direction from a member to the contrary; SO 158 to 
be read accordingly. This order has now been superseded by an amendment to SO 158, adding para 
(4) in similar terms: refer (1996] AJHR 1.18B. 
42 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 29. 
43 Standing Orders 78, 79(2). 
member in charge of the Bill moves a motion nominating the select committee 
to which the Bill will be referred. The member may include in the motion any 
special powers or instruction in respect of the committee's consideration of the 
Bill that the member has indicated in the second reading debate are to be 
proposed. 44 Provided notice is given prior to the second reading a motion 
moving an amendment to substitute another committee or to alter the special 
powers or instructions may be moved. Depending on the make up of 
committees and the measure in question, the member in charge of the Bill could 
well nominate a committee expected to be more amenable to the government's 
proposal than the obvious subject committee. However, this would alert the 
opposition parties to suspect the government's motives and even parties 
sympathetic to the government might vote for an amendment. The motion for 
amendment would have to be with the Clerk at the Table before the second 
reading, so the opposition parties would not necessarily have adequate 
forewarning of the government's intention. 
In practice, much negotiation goes on behind the scenes. The opposition parties 
do have forewarning and will have indicated to the government whether or not 
they will oppose the motion, which allows the government to take into account 
the strength of the opposition to the motion when considering whether or not to 
persevere with its motion. This demonstrates the operation of the law of 
anticipatory reaction; namely that all governments are conscious of the likely 
reaction to their proposals, especially the reaction of the opposition parties.
45 
In some circumstances, an opposition party may not wish a Bill to be referred to 
the relevant subject committee. For example, it may wish the Bill to go to a 
committee in which it has a majority or certain key members or the chairperson 
is from that opposition party. Alternatively, there may be a choice of 
appropriate committees where the subject matter of a Bill crosses boundaries. 
In these circumstances an opposition member could table a motion for an 
4
·
1 Standing Order 280. 
45 Jackson, above n 28, 95. 
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amendment on the assumption that the government will refer the Bill to a 
particular committee and withdraw the motion if the government acts otherwise. 
V SELECT COMMITTEES 
A Introduction 
This Part will examine the select committee stage of the legislative process in 
greater depth as it is generally accepted as the most important stage in the 
enactment of a Bill and the stage which provides the opposition parties and 
individual members with the most scope to influence the legislative process and 
outcome. 46 This examination will take place against the background of MMP 
and in the context of the new Standing Orders. 
The primary purpose of the select committee stage is to permit careful and 
detailed scrutiny of Bills and policy by the public and the committee. They are 
also a useful and efficient means of dealing with a large amount of work. Skene 
notes that "committees deal with matters that are too detailed, too unwieldy, 
too difficult politically or too mundane for the full House" . 
47 Committees are a 
useful and effective way of enabling the House to get through a large amount of 
work, and of dealing with complex subject matter. 
In the 1960s and 1970s few Bills were referred to select committees and little 
change was made to legislation between introduction and enactment. 
48 In 
recent years, however, almost all Bills have been referred to select committees 
Writing in 1990, Skene noted changes in the functions of select committees in 
the period from the 1960s to the 1980s and identified a trend of weakening 
party control over committees. He suggests that party discipline had been 
reduced; government backbenchers were growing more independent of the 
Executive and that ministerial control of the legislative process was in decline. 
However, party discipline and the government's need to pass its legislation 
46 See Boston et al, above n 2, 79; and aboYe n 6, 6. 
47 Skene, above n 26, 2. 
48 Skene, above n 26, 17. 
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continued, then, to pervade the committee process and so it was necessary for 
committees to have both a government majority and a government chairperson, 
such chairpersons being carefully selected by party leaders to avoid appointing 
what Skene called "rogue cannons" to committee chairs.49 
In an MMP environment, the select committee will be the obvious forum for the 
inter-party negotiation of deals which will be necessary to enable the 
government to govern. 50 
B Party Proportional Membership 
Membership of select committees is determined by the House. The Business 
Committee will consider nominations put forward by the parties and make 
recommendations to the House as to appointments. Although there is a 
requirement that the overall representation of parties on committees should 
reflect the balance of the parties in the House, there is no requirement that this 
should be so for each committee. It is conceivable, therefore, that the 
government may be in a majority on some committees and in a minority on 
others or in a minority on every committee. A particular opposition party may 
have sufficient numbers to dominate a particular committee. 
It is likely that each opposition party will have fewer seats than the 
gover~ent51 and, although in the House they may unite to oppose the 
government on a particular measure, they may not have sufficient identity of 
interest in select committee to out vote or sway the government members. 
With around 20 to 24 government members unavailable for select committee 
work because they are part of the Executive, the proportional nature of the 
overall membership of select committees will be disturbed, unless some 
49 Skene, above n 26, 24. 
50 Palmer, above n 6, 6 where Palmer said "It is already clear that [select committees] are becoming the 
primary focus for settling details of legislation in an environment where it is necessary to have 
consensus to settle them ... ". 
51 However, there is no requirement that the leader of the largest single party elected should be asked to 
form a government. 
government members serve on more than one committee. 
52 A single party 
minority government would have some difficulty in providing enough members 
to cover all the committees. Other issues arise in a coalition government -
presuming that coalition partners will not be large. The relative strengths of the 
partners will be important in determining how select committee membership is 
distributed. 
As the Business Committee itself should reflect the balance of parties in the 
House and attempts to reach its decisions by consensus or, failing that, by near 
unanimity, the government will not necessarily be able to stack the committees 
to suit itself. This should assist a fair distribution of appointments among the 
parties, although much will depend on the relative numbers in the House of the 
government and opposition parties. 
The House makes the final decision on appointments and the final result will 
depend on how the recommendations of the Business Committee are perceived 
and whether they are unanimous or near unanimous recommendations. 
Of the countries visited by the Standing Orders Committee in 1995,5
3 the 
membership of committees is determined as far as possible in proportion to the 
relative size of the party in the House in Germany, Denmark and Norway. 
However, in Norway, members may sit on only one committee. 
54 
In Germany, members compete for appointment to prestigious committees. The 
Fraktionen propose members of committees to the President. The members 
indicate to the whips which committee they want to sit on, although established 
members are more likely than new members to be appointed to their preferred 
committee. Some weight is given to the particular expertise of a member in 
determining membership. There is relatively high stability in the membership of 
5
~ List members would be the most obvious candidates for serving on more than one committee in this 
situation. 
53 The countries visited were Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. 
51 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 265. 
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committees especially on the more prestigious committees (Appropriation and 
Defence). 55 
In Denmark, the Folketing (the House of Representatives) appoints the 
members to committees. Several parties will often enter into electoral pacts in 
order to obtain the maximum number of seats on a given committee. 56 
C Size and Representativeness of Select Committees 
Under the new Standing Orders there will be 12 subject select committees with 
eight members each (an increase from five). In a Parliament with 120 members, 
assuming around 96 available for select committee work (as did the Standing 
Orders select committee), no member should be required to sit on more than 
one committee. In theory, at least, this should give members the opportunity to 
develop expertise in particular subject areas. 
In Germany, with the reduction in the number of committees over several years, 
there has also been a reduction in the number of members who are needed to 
serve on more than one committee. However, this has not greatly reduced the 
workload of the more senior members (party officials and spokespersons and 
members of the Council of Elders) of the Bundestag who also chair 
committees. 57 
Opposition parties have an advantage on select committees insofar as their 
experts, the party spokespersons in particular areas, are members of committees 
whereas the Government's main experts are likely to be in Cabinet and therefore 
not available to sit on committees. However, government select committee 
members will also have the opportunity to develop expertise. 
55 Nevil Johnson "Committee in the West German Bundestag" in JD Lees and M Shaw (eds) 
Committees in Legislatures (Duke University Press, 1979) 102, 117. 
56 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 320. 
57 Johnson, above n 55, 116. 
New Zealand committees are small by comparison with those of Germany (19 
to 41 members) and Denmark ( 17 members) . In Denmark, no committee has a 
government majority. If a small party is not represented on a committee, it may 
have two members attend and participate, but not vote. 
D Substitution 
Since 1985, the select committee system has suffered a number of difficulties: 
members were burdened with positions on more than one committee and 
substitution was common, leading to a lack of continuity on committees. 
58 
Skene attributes the problem of substitution to members themselves who have 
demonstrated a reluctance to sit on committees due to the lack of political pay-
back derived from such work, reflected in the lower level of media attention it 
attracts relative to other activities open to members . He observed that fewer 
members attend committees in an election year. 
59 
There is a need for continuity in membership and regular attendance of members 
to assist the development of expertise and the growth of committee loyalty. The 
development of expertise is hampered if the membership of a committee is 
constantly changing. The growth of committee loyalty will enhance the non-
partisan nature of committee work and increase the independence of 
committees. 
As the new Standing Orders contemplate members having to sit on only one 
committee, this may reduce the problem of substitution. However, some 
substitution will be necessary - there will be occasions when it is sensible to 
allow substitution and the Standing Orders Committee indicated that 
substitution also has value in exposing more members to a greater diversity of 
issues. Permanent changes to select committee membership will require the 
58 Skene, above n 26, 6. 
59 Skene, above n 26, 9. 
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approval of the Business Committee; whereas temporary substitutions will be 
the responsibility of party whips or party leaders. 
Members are more likely to attend caucus committees where members are more 
likely to have an effect on party policy. The detailed work of select committees, 
though extremely valuable, is time consuming and not always acknowledged by 
the electorate. Further, members do not always see it as to their advantage to 
develop expertise in a particular area as they may fear that it limits their options 
for advancement and their constituents are concerned with the more 
fundamental issues such as unemployment. Under MMP, the list members will 
be less constrained in this way and the list is more likely to be a source of 
expertise as in Germany. This has its disadvantages in Germany, where the 
Bundestag is considered to be dominated by the educated middle class and is 
therefore not representative of a cross section of the community. 60 
E Subcommittees 
Standing Order 203 provides for committees to appoint subcommittees and to 
prescribe the procedure of subcommittees provided that it is consistent with 
Standing Orders. 61 The Committee expressed the belief of its members that 
subcommittees make efficient use of time. This is another possible avenue of 
influence for opposition members to explore. 
In the United States, senate and congressional committees may establish 
subcommittees. Lees has noted an increase in the use of subcommittees by US 
congressional committees due to the pressure of work. The establishment of 
senate subcommittees is often indicative of the particular concerns of individual 
senators and may be used to influence public opinion in support of a legislative 
proposal. 62 
60 Burkett, above n 31,291. 
61 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 37. 
62 John D Lees "Committees in the United States Congress" in John D Lees and Malcom Shaw (eds) 
Committees in Legislatures: A Comparative Analysis (Martin Robertson & Co Ltd, Oxford, 1979) 3, 
19. 
F Chairperson of Select Committees 
Currently committees select their own chairperson at the first meeting of the 
committee, but prior to that meeting there has usually been some inter-party 
discussion on who is likely to be selected.63 Traditionally, all chairpersons have 
been government members except the chairperson of the Regulations Review 
Committee which, since 1985, has been chaired by an opposition member. 
Committees will continue to elect their own chairpersons. However, with the 
likelihood of committees having different balances of parties represented, it is 
likely that chairpersons also will come from a variety of parties, but not 
necessarily the party with the largest membership on the committee, as the chair 
will be a matter for negotiation. Colin James predicts that a minor degree of 
independence might develop in select committees insofar as they are chaired by 
non-government members. 64 
Recognising the greater number of members that committees will have, the 
Standing Orders Committee recommended that there should also be deputy 
chairpersons and that, in contrast to the previous procedure, the positions of 
chairperson and deputy chairperson should not remain fixed for the whole life of 
the Parliament. A member may move, on seven days notice, that the 
chairperson or deputy be removed. 65 
As a result of the frustration which Ministers may experience in operating within 
a multi-party Cabinet, and the shift in power to select committees, the position 
of chairperson of a select committee may come to be seen as an acceptable 
63 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 35. 
64 Colin James "The Way It Might Be" in Colin James and Alan McRobie (eds) Turning Point: The 1993 
Election and Beyond (Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 139, 142. 
65 Standing Order 206(2). 
25 
26 
alternative career path to ministerial office. The chairs of the more powerful and 
prestigious committees may become more sought after. 
In Denmark, the chairs of committees are allocated proportionally at a meeting 
of party leaders. In Germany, chairs are distributed proportionally with the 
parties usually having come to some agreement as to which committees each 
will chair.66 Committees elect their own chairpersons in Norway, although in 
practice the elections are decided in advance by negotiation among the parties. 
In Ireland chairpersons are elected by the committees although the names of 
those proposed are usually agreed to by the whips. These examples indicate 
that the election of chairpersons is generally negotiated. 
G Ministers and Select Committees 
Since 1985 Ministers have not taken part in select committee proceedings. This 
was an attempt to separate the Executive from Parliament. 67 It also recognised 
that Ministers rarely attended select committee meetings. However, the 
Standing Orders Committee perceived it as essential for Ministers to be directly 
involved in the legislative work of committees, especially for a minority 
government. 68 The Committee recommended that Ministers should be able to 
participate in proceedings on Bills, but should not be able to vote. In effect, the 
role of Ministers will be to brief the committee, hear evidence and answer for 
the policy. However, the presence of a Minister may inhibit government 
members and encourage them to push the government line more strenuously 
than they might otherwise. 
Ministers are expected to attend if invited by the committee and answer 
questions concerning legislation they are promoting. The appearance of 
66 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 267 . 
67 Geoffrey Palmer Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand 's Constitution & Government 
(2 edn, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 138. 
68 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 35. 
Ministers before select committees should provide opportunities for more 
intensive questioning of those Ministers than does question time in the House. 
Select committee procedure is less ritualised than procedure in the House, 
although it is also less public. Burkett has noted that in Germany Ministers 
sometimes find themselves facing questions from committee members who are 
also experts in the relevant policy area. 69 
H Functions and Operation of Select Committees 
The House may control the ambit of a committee's scrutiny by setting the terms 
of reference for the committee in the second reading debate and motion of 
reference. In any event, the brief of the committee is to attend to the detail of a 
Bill and determine whether the Bill should be passed in the form in which it was 
introduced. The purpose and principles of the Bill are debated and agreed by 
the House at the second reading stage and it is not open to the committee to 
revisit that decision. This is at variance with the brief of non-Westminster 
committees, which generally are endowed with a wider range of powers than 
Westminster committees. For example, United States committees have complete 
powers over Bills referred to them. 
70 
Iles has noted among the advantages of the scrutiny of Bills by select 
committees, that members generally act in a non-partisan way and consider Bills 
in a constructive manner. Members obtain a great deal of useful information 
about, and develop expertise in, the subject matter of Bills referred to them. 
This has stood them in good stead in the second reading debate and the 
committee of the whole House stage and in future will continue to be beneficial. 
The select committee stage is an important quality control stage as Bills are 
subjected to the most detailed scrutiny that they will encounter and errors and 
69 Burkett, above n 31, 299. 
70 Jackson, above n 28, 11 3. 
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impracticalities of Bills are often identified during the hearing of public 
submissions and the consideration ofBills. 71 
Although committees have traditionally behaved in a relatively non-partisan 
way, this is not always the case. As David Caygill described it: "The degree of 
partisan behaviour on the committees often depends on the political significance 
attached to the measures". 72 
Most legislation introduced into Parliament is non-contentious. Much of it is 
what could be described as housekeeping legislation which keeps the 
bureaucracy functioning. However, the contentious legislation which is 
introduced can attract substantial publicity and scrutiny, far out of proportion to 
its true importance. In Germany, as in New Zealand, committee members tend 
to vote along party lines if a matter is contentious, but Johnston notes that, in 
Germany, committees strive to achieve unanimity where possible. 73 
Although New Zealand, until recently, was one of the most extreme 
majoritarian systems, its select committee system is considered to be one of the 
most developed in the Commonwealth, that is, among other majoritarian 
systems. The Standing Orders Committee noted that governments are corning 
to rely on the select committee system to provide for public discussion and the 
refinement oflegislation. 74 For example, in New Zealand, it is usual practice to 
seek public submissions on Bills referred to select committees, but this is not the 
norm overseas, although Ireland has recently adopted this practice. 75 
71 Walter Iles, "New Zealand Exl)erience of Scrutiny of Parliament's Legislation" (1991) 12 Statute Law 
Review 165. 
72 David Caygill, "Functions and Powers of Parliamentary Select Committees: A New Zealand 
Perspective" in Mai Chen & GWR Palmer Public Law in New Zealand: Cases, Materials, Commentary 
and Questions (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993) 670. 
73 Johnson, above n 55, 120. 
74 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 31: It commented that "[n]owhere else in the Commonwealth do 
committees give such open and in depth consideration to legislation" . 
75 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 263. 
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I Report of Select Committee 
A select committee is now required to present its report on a Bill to Parliament 
no later than six months after the Bill was referred to the committee or such 
later time as the House allows. The intention is to prevent Bills being referred to 
select committees and never reappearing. If the committee fails to present its 
report within the required time the Bill goes back into the House and is set 
down for its next stage. 
76 This provides an incentive for the committee to turn 
its collective mind to the Bill and how best to improve it as the alternative is to 
let a Bill, which is likely to be inadequate in some respects, back into the House 
without the benefit of proper scrutiny. A committee that did not report back on 
a Bill within the set period and which then found the Bill withdrawn from the 
committee and back before the House unamended would be unpopular with 
those sections of the community with a stake in the legislation and which had 
put time and effort into making submissions to the committee. It has also 
removed a weapon from the government's armoury for dealing with legislation 
it does not wish to proceed. 
A similar rule applies in Germany, where the originator of a motion to refer a 
Bill to a committee may demand a report to the Bundestag after six months. 
This rule was adopted in West Germany, as it then was, in order to prevent 
legislation being buried in the committee. It has not often been necessary to 
demand such a report as it appears that committees have found other ways of 
holding up progress.
77 
A useful innovation is the provision by a committee of a narrative report on a 
Bill, which it has dealt with. This report is to be attached to the front of the 
reported-back version of the Bill as an explanatory note.
78 
76 Standing Order 284 . The Housing Responsibilities Bill is the first and only Bill to have been 
discharged from select committee and set down for its next stage (28 August 1996). 
77 Johnson, above n 55, 121 
78 Standing Orders Report, above n 15, 44. See for example the reported back version of the Fisheries 
Bill (now the Fisheries Act 1996), which had an eJq)lanatory note of 44 pages. 
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The Standing Orders Committee recommended that there should be more 
opportunity to debate significant select committee reports in the House and that 
the Business Committee include such debates on the Order Paper with 
members' orders of the day on each alternate Wednesday. 
The Standing Orders distinguish between amendments to Bills made by a 
majority of a committee and those made unanimously.79 This adds to the 
incentives for a committee to try and achieve decisions by consensus as, 
arguably, there is less chance of unanimous decisions being overturned by the 
House. 80 Where amendments are recommended by the committee unanimously 
those amendments are adopted as part of the Bill when the House agrees that 
the Bill should proceed. Those amendments recommended by a majority of the 
committee are subject to agreement by the House. 81 If the House does not 
agree that a Bill should proceed it is discharged immediately. 82 
79 Standing Order 285 . 
80 
For example, in the case of the Finance Bill (No 6) 1996, a majority of the select committee 
recommended that the social security measures included in the Bill should be dropped, but those 
measures were retained. 
81 Standing Order 292. 
81 Standing Order 291(1). 
VI RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTY CAUCUSES AND 
SELECT COMMITTEES 
This Part will consider to what extent select committees may become more 
powerful and more independent. A counterweight to the development of 
powerful and independent select committees is the constraint of party discipline 
as imposed by party caucuses. 
A Party Caucuses 
The system of party caucuses, although not uruque to New Zealand and 
Australia, has been developed and refined to a greater extent in these two 
countries than anywhere else in the world. 
Each party represented in the House will have a caucus. Parliamentary caucuses 
comprise all the parliamentary members of a party, from Ministers (in the 
governing party) to backbenchers. From a practical point of view, it has always 
been the government party caucus which has been most influential in affecting 
the legislative outputs of Parliament. Under MMP it is likely that there will be 
more than one party in government and therefore there may be two or more 
government caucuses. Similarly, there are likely to be a number of opposition 
party caucuses. 
Caucuses traditionally meet in private, and their deliberations are not made 
public. The government caucus has, in recent years, assigned a caucus 
committee to shadow each select committee of the House. Caucus committees 
undertake a substantial amount of work. They may become involved at an early 
stage in the formulation of legislation and approve draft Bills before 
introduction. 
32 
B Relationship between the Government Caucus and Select Committees 
pre-MMP 
Traditionally the government caucus, through its committees, has effectively 
controlled select committees as the government had a majority in the House and 
in the select committees. 83 By convention, select committees do not deliberate 
on a Bill until the respective party caucuses have considered it. Control by the 
government caucus means control by the Executive as Ministers are generally a 
significant proportion of the government members and they have greater 
experience in politics and in Parliament than most backbenchers. The influence 
of the Executive over caucus is enhanced by their better access to information 
and advice. 
Party control over its members is not absolute, however. There are from time to 
time issues upon which there is no strong party view and other issues which are 
considered to be matters for a member's own conscience to determine how he 
or she will behave or vote. Free voting is usually permitted on local issues which 
are generally not party political, on moral issues (eg Michael Laws' Death with 
Dignity Bill) and on occasional issues where politics are not relevant. 84 
Even though New Zealand's system of party control over members is strong it 
is actually relatively relaxed when compared to the level of discipline in the 
Parliaments visited by the Standing Orders Committee. In Germany, where the 
electoral system is MMP, and in the other countries visited, the Committee 
found that party discipline is generally tighter than in New Zealand,85 some 
systems not permitting even conscience votes. 86 New Zealand members of 
Parliament are accustomed to a certain level of independence when undertaking 
their select committee duties, and are unlikely to be willing to give up that 
independence, because of the change to the electoral system. 
83 Harris and McLeay, above n 3, 127. 
8
~ Alan Robinson Notes on New Zealand Politics (School of Political Science and Public Administration, 
Wellington, 1970) 85 . 
85 Wyatt Creech, comment in MMP Newsletter f or Chief Executives July 1995 . 
86 Nicola White, personal communication. 
The leader of the New Zealand First Party, Winston Peters, has been highly 
critical of the exercise of party discipline and his party has made a point of 
emphasising that its members should vote in accordance with the wishes of their 
electorates. 87 A stand against the pre-eminence of the party may be attractive to 
voters who are generally uncomfortable with party discipline. 
In 1970 Robinson identified six reasons for the existence of strong party 
discipline in New Zealand, summarised here:
88 
1. It is impossible for a member to rebel and then to survive outside one of the 
main parties. Members are elected largely because of the party they represent; 
2. Each of the major parties is highly centralised in its leadership functions. The 
views of the party leader carry a lot of weight; 
3. Members of the small Parliamentary parties in New Zealand have a strong 
loyalty to their group and a strong community of spirit . The fact of loyalty 
produces an impulse to conformity; 
4. In caucus varying opinions are expressed and given due weight, therefore a 
member can expect to lose out on some issues but expect to win on others; 
5. The possibility of rewards of some kind for good behaviour eg Cabinet office, 
appointments or overseas travel; 
6. The nature of the party system - that the purpose of the parties is to win a 
majority in Parliament and so gain control of the power exercised by the 
Executive. To govern, a party needs to maintain solidarity within its ranks. A 
unified party appeals more to voters than one that has open divisions. 
The doctrine of mandate provided one of the traditional justifications for the 
need to maintain party discipline. 
89 The manifestos of party policy published 
during election campaigns allowed the electorate to choose which of the two 
main parties it wanted to form the government. Once elected the government 
87 (1995) 552 NZPD 10809, where Mr Peters expressed his opposition to the introduction ofprox-y voting, 
and at 10826. 
88 Robinson, above n 84, 85 . 
89 Mai Chen, Geoffrey Palmer & Trevor Roberts Practical Issues for Lawyers arising from MMP (New 
Zealand Law Society Seminar Paper, Wellington, 1995) 4. 
,..,,.., 
.) _, 
34 
was expected to implement its "election promises" and to do this it needed to be 
sure of the support of its parliamentary members. As a result, a majority 
government is more vulnerable to dissent within the ranks of its members than 
from attack from the opposition parties.90 However the doctrine of mandate has 
been eroded over recent years as both main parties when in power have acted 
contrary to election promises contained in their manifestos. 91 
C Party Cohesion and Committees in Multi-Party Parliaments 
Shaw has put forward a general rule on the relationship between party control 
and strong committees. He states that "control by a single cohesive party tends 
to be associated with weak committees" and vice versa. 92 The number of 
parties in Parliament tends to influence the conventions and rules as to the 
composition of select committees. 93 Other factors affecting the strength of 
select committees suggested by Harris and McLeay are the permanence or 
otherwise of the select committee system (permanence tending to cement the 
powers of committees and positions of leadership), and the formal power of 
committees. 
Shaw has found that committees are strongest where there is the lowest level of 
party control over them, either because of the lack of party cohesion or where a 
single party is unable to dominate the committees. 
The United States has the strongest committee system (although it has been 
suggested that it is a deviant case because of its undisciplined party system and 
its separate executive) .94 Lees points to the federal nature of the US political 
90 Crossman notes that the important debates take place in caucus rather than in the House: RH Crossman 
"Introduction" in W Bagehot The English Constitution (Fontana, London, 1977) in Chen & Palmer 
221. And Jackson also comments that "insider pressure groups, the public service and caucus" may be 
more influential with the Government than the Opposition: see above n 28, 95. 
91 Alan McRobie "The Electoral System" in PA Joseph (ed) Essays on the Constitution (Brookers Ltd, 
Wellington, 1995) 312,321. 
92 M Shaw "Committees in Legislatures" in P Norton (ed) Legislatures (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1990) 246. 
93 Harris and McLeay, above n 3, 125 . 
94 Jackson, above n 28, 113. 
process as a major reason "for the relatively weak nature of American political 
parties and the relative absence of party discipline in Congress". 
95 He notes that 
the US Congress makes most of its legislative decisions in committees or 
subcommittees. 
In Germany, the specialist committee system provides opportunities for close 
cross-questioning of Ministers on policy and administration. The committee 
stage provides opportunities for opposition members to influence the final form 
of Bills, even to the extent of so amending them that they emerge in a different 
form and indeed with different intent from that planned by the government. A 
Bill's original provisions may then have to be restored in the plenary session 
where, in Germany, party discipline is more effective than in committee.
96 
However, the amendment of a Bill after the committee stage is generally 
unwelcome, as, according to Johnston, it implies a rejection of the committee's 
laboriously engineered compromises.
97 
For a majoritarian system, New Zealand select committees have exercised a 
relatively broad range of powers. They are able to undertake inquiries on their 
own initiative, receive submissions on Bills and hear evidence from the public. 
Bills, other than urgent or financial measures, have been referred to select 
committees compulsorily since 1979. 
98 
New Zealand committees, under MMP, are likely to continue to focus on the 
detail of Bills as Standing Orders provide for the second reading aebate to set 
the parameters of the select committees jurisdiction, in effect, its terms of 
reference. 
95 Lees, above n 62, 11. 
96 Burkett, above n 31. This has occurred recently in New Zealand, with the Finance Act (No 6) 1996 
where the committee, by a majority, removed provisions amending the Social Security Act only to have 
those provisions restored by the House. 
97 Johnson, above n 55, 125. 
98 Geoff Skene "Parliament: Reassessing its Role" in H Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in Perspective 
(3 ed Longman Paul, Auckland, 1992) 252. 
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D Anticipated Effect of MMP on the Relationship between Caucuses and 
Select Committees 
The Standing Orders have at last recognised what has been a political reality for 
many years, namely that political parties are an integral part of New Zealand's 
constitutional and electoral systems;99 individual members have little 
recognition. Members will continue to be elected because of the party they 
represent, especially list members. List members will be especially vulnerable to 
control by the party since the party controls the list. Recalcitrant members may 
find themselves moved lower down the party list for the next election. 100 
Given that it is unlikely that New Zealand will have a single party majority 
government after 12 October 1996, it is also unlikely that a single party will be 
in a position to dominate select committees as have government caucuses in the 
past. There may be a coalition majority government which could exert 
substantial influence over select committees if it were of one mind. However, it 
is probable that where there are two or more parties in government, there will 
also be two or more government party caucuses and those caucuses may pull in 
different directions, except on confidence matters, or matters specifically agreed 
in the coalition agreement. 
As a consequence parties will have to be prepared to negotiate the outcome of 
select committee deliberations. The members of the select committees are likely 
to have developed some knowledge and expertise in the relevant area and are in 
close contact with each other, making the select committee the obvious forum 
for party negotiations to take place. This being so, individual members are likely 
to be in a better position than prior to 11:MP to influence their caucuses and 
99 Wyatt Creech, one of the members of the Standing Orders Committee, has noted that parties are the 
focus of the M1v1P system: MMP Newsletter f or Chief Executives July 1995. 
100 The President of the National Party, Geoff Thompson, has expressed the view that party influence will 
"continue at an increasing level ... [b]ecause the Party controls the fonnation of the List": "The Role of 
a Political Party in Policy Development and Policy Decisions" Paper given at AIC Conference, April 
1996 Strategic Policy Developments in an MMP Environment, 9-10. 
their members in Cabinet (if applicable), rather than being influenced by their 
caucuses. It is likely that there will be less control of committees by caucuses in 
a multi-party environment because negotiations will be required "between rather 
than within" parties. 
101 
The Royal Commission noted in its Report
102 that the small size of caucuses 
under MMP may weaken the channel of influence from the public through the 
backbench members who are likely to be more in touch with their constituents. 
This weakening may allow Ministers to dominate the government caucus or 
caucuses too easily and reduce the influence of backbenchers. However, as 
noted above, government members are less likely to be in a majority on 
committees than formerly, and it can be expected that committee members who 
have become specialists in an area will be influential in their caucuses. 
The doctrine of mandate is no longer a valid justification for parties to exert 
discipline over their members, since both main parties have ignored promises 
made to their electorate in their manifestos. The doctrine of mandate generally 
works better in a two-party majoritarian system under which voters can choose 
between manifestos and have a reasonable expectation that the policies for 
which they voted would be implemented. 
103 In a multi-party system, manifestos 
are likely to contain less detail and more philosophy than in the past as parties 
wishing to form a coalition will not wish to be constrained by detailed 
statements of policy when negotiating coalition agreements. Greater flexibility is 
necessary in party policy, although it is also necessary for members to adhere to 
such policies as are fundamental to their party and any agreements it may have 
entered into. 
The need to negotiate and adhere to coalition agreements will reinforce party 
cohesion as parties involved in a coalition or other parliamentary agreement will 
101 Harris and McLeay, above n 3, 127. 
102 Towards a Better Democracy, above n 8, 122. 
103 Vernon Bogdanor Multi party Politics and the Constitution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1983) 82 . 
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need to be able to ensure that their members can be relied upon to vote in 
support of such arrangements. 
The need to maintain a coalition agreement may not be as strong an incentive to 
conformity as was the doctrine of mandate. Members may have felt a stronger 
commitment to policies endorsed by the electorate than they are likely to feel 
under MMP where policies may be more fluid to allow parties to manoeuvre 
when making deals with other parties. 
It is useful to consider whether, once MMP is a reality, Robinson's six reasons 
for strong party discipline in New Zealand are likely to continue to apply.104 
Reason 1 is likely to be even more true of the New Zealand situation as 
discussed earlier in this section. 
1. As a party system, members will continue to be elected because of the party 
they represent. This will be especially so for list members. 
2. There is no obvious reason for the centralised nature of party leadership to be 
affected by MMP, since this is more a result of New Zealand's unitary status 
than an effect of its electoral system . 
3. Caucuses, being smaller, may in fact be more cohesive than in the past, as they 
may be more focussed on what are significant issues for them and therefore 
attract members who sympathise with the party policy on those issues. 
Therefore, there should be a lesser tendency for individual members to dissent 
from the party line, especially on issues fundamental to the philosophy of the 
party. 
4. Individual members are likely to continue to find that they win on some issues in 
their respective caucuses and lose on others. However, with smaller caucuses, 
winning a point in one's caucus is less likely to mean winning it in the House. 
5. Rewards for loyalty will still be available although some may change - some 
may become more sought after than they have been in the past, such as the 
10
~ Refer section VI B above. 
chairs of select committees. But the granting of some rewards may be less sure 
where the Government is a minority or part of a coalition. 
6. The nature of the party system will be profoundly altered. The winning of a 
clear majority in the House in an election may become an almost attainable goal. 
Although it will still be desirable it may not drive the behaviour of members and 
parties in the same way. 
E Outcome for New Zealand 
A number of commentators have warned against predicting what will happen in 
New Zealand on the basis of the experience of other countries, especially 
Germany; New Zealand's new electoral system being most closely based on the 
German model. 105 Germany has had two different experiences of proportional 
representation, namely under the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic.
106 
Culture is an important factor and the German experience is a result of a 
combination of a number of factors, including German culture, its recent 
traumatic history (the Weimar Republic followed by Hitler and the Second 
World War), as well as its MMP electoral system. 
New Zealand's individual political culture must be considered. Don Hunn 
wrote that it should not be expected that New Zealand's experience of MMP 
will reflect Germany's "since it is unlikely the political alchemy of New Zealand 
will produce identical , outcomes to those of ... Germany". 
107 
New Zealand is a unitary state with a unicameral Parliament. It still has a 
relatively small population, and until fairly recently its political culture was 
essentially Pakeha and derived from Westminster. More recently there has been 
a growing politicisation of Maori which adds a unique New Zealand dimension. 
105 James, above n 64, 139; Vernon Bogdanor "Conclusion" in Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler (eds) 
Democracy and Elections - Electoral systems and their political consequences (Cambridge University 
Press, 1983) 251. 
106 Bogdanor, above n 105, 251. 
107 Don Hunn.MM? Newsletter for Chief Executives (June 1994). 
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A dramatic indication of New Zealand's unique political culture is that it is 
prepared to countenance changing its electoral system so that it moves from 
being one of the most majoritarian states to a multi-party state. Also to be 
considered are the degree to which members are used to some measure of 
independence and the tradition of relatively impartial select committees. 
It is unclear whether caucuses will be able to maintain control over their 
members in the House in an MMP environment. On the one hand, party 
discipline may be seen as essential to the ability of governing parties to hold a 
coalition together, as a maverick MP may be in a position to destroy a coalition 
agreement single-handedly. On the other hand, New Zealand members are 
accustomed to a greater degree of independence than the members of 
Parliaments visited by the Standing Orders Committee, and are unlikely to give 
up such independence as they have. 108 
A number of factors suggest that select committees will become stronger and 
more independent under MMP. 
• The multi-party environment will be more conducive to stronger committees 
than was New Zealand's plurality system. 
• Relative to other Westminster systems, New Zealand committees have a broad 
range of functions and powers. 
• If consensus is to be achieved in select committee, members must have the 
authority to ne?otiate. Consensus will be much more difficult to achieve if party 
caucuses can veto the decisions taken by the c9mmittee. 
• The doctrine of mandate is no longer valid. 
• Committee members will have the opportunity to develop expertise in specialist 
areas, making them more influential in their caucuses. 
However, the position of party caucuses is less clear. Some factors point to an 
increase in power, namely -
• The need to honour coalition arrangements. 
108 Nicola White, personal communication. 
• The Standing Orders recognise the importance of the party. 
• Smaller caucuses are generally more cohesive and it is easier for the Executive 
to dominate small caucuses. 
and some factors suggest a loss of influence in favour of committees-
• No one caucus will be able to dominate select committees. 
• Negotiations will be required between rather than within parties. 
Whatever happens to party discipline under MMP, party members are likely to 
have more leeway to differ from the party line, but will be required to support 
their party absolutely on the matters of principle which the party as a whole 
considers to be basic to its existence, or, in relation to governing parties, on 
matters of confidence. Such matters of principle or confidence may be very 
narrowly defined so that members have a lot of freedom, but no disloyalty may 
be accepted in that narrow area. For example, absolute loyalty may be 
demanded on matters basic to a coalition agreement, but coalition partners may 
well feel free to vote against each other on less important issues.
109 
Party cohesion need not hinder the development of independent select 
committees as members of a cohesive party will make their contribution to the 
work of the select committee from their party point of view. This is different 
from a committee making a decision and having it overturned by government 
caucus. 
It is not possible to predict with certainty what changes may occur in the 
relationship between party caucuses and select committees under MMP but that 
relationship will be different from what it was under FPP. 
109 For example, Trevor Mallard's Education Amendment Act 1996 which will require the compulsory 
registration of teachers. The enactment of this Bill in the face of Government opposition is an unusual 
and possibly unique event in New Zealand's parlian1entary history and was made possible because the 
National Party's coalition partner, the United Party, voted for the Bill. 
41 
VII IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND 
LEGISLATION 
A Members 'Bills 
There has been much speculation about the possible increased success of 
members' Bills under MMP, both with the likelihood of a minority government 
and the removal of the appropriation rule in favour of the financial veto. 
However, individual members, especially opposition members, do not have 
access to the specialised drafting services, and legal and policy advice that is 
necessary to draft legislation with a reasonable prospect of success. There is no 
indication that this will change very much under MMP, although the budget of 
the Clerk of the House has been increased to provide for drafting services for 
members. In the countries visited by the Standing Orders Committee there were 
few members' Bills introduced. In those countries the initiation of legislation is 
still very much a function of the government. 
In Ireland, only one member's Bill per party may be before the House at a time. 
The Government will almost always oppose such Bills so there is little chance of 
enactment 
In the past, backbench members have occasionally been successful in securing 
the support of their caucus and Cabinet for their own legislative proposals. The 
rate of success in recent years has been the enactment of about one member's 
Bill a year, with three in 1994 and none in 1995. Members' Bills are controlled 
by rules as to when they may be introduced and the need for a ballot among the 
various Bills proposed, so there can be no certainty that any particular Bill will 
ever be introduced. There is now provision for Bills, including members' Bills, 
to be introduced during an adjournment subject to the agreement of the 
Business Committee. 110 This rule may allow more members' Bills to be 
110 Standing Order 272. 
D 
introduced subject to the acquiescence of the Government. While the House is 
sitting, members' orders of the day, together with private and local orders of the 
day, are restricted to alternate Wednesdays and even on the allotted Wednesday 
they may be displaced by certain government business. 
Members' Bills have other purposes than the enactment of legislation. They 
have traditionally been used tactically to make a political point, engender 
support in the member's electorate, or embarrass the Government into doing 
something to forestall the Bill gathering supporters in the House. There have 
been occasions when the Government has either adopted a member's Bill (the 
Historic Places Act 1954) or introduced its own legislation covering the same 
subject matter (the Decimal Currency Act and more recently the Protected 
Disclosures Bill). Members' Bills are also used tactically in Germany, where an 
opposition member may introduce a Bill on the same subject as a government 
Bill in order to demonstrate to the FDP ( one government coalition partner) that 
the member's party and the FDP were much closer on the issue than either party 
was to the SPD (the other coalition partner).
111 In Ireland, it has been found 
that, even if a member's Bill does not become law, it is a more useful way of 
focusing public attention on a topic than a motion on the same topic. 
112 
Even if a member's Bill is never introduced, but is left waiting to win the ballot, 
the mere announcement of the intention to promote a Bill on a particular issue 
attracts media and public interest, as with Jill White's Chemical Trespass Bill, 
especially since the media appear to be unaware of the need for a ballot and 
assume that any member can introduce a Bill. 
Members' Bills tend to address a single aspect of an issue which has become 
political and recommend piecemeal legislation without dealing with all the 
repercussions of the measure that they propose. An example is the Irradiation 
Plant Public Consultation Bill recently introduced by Mark Burton. This Bill 
addresses an issue which has become highly emotive in the areas where 
111 Burkett, above n 31,292. 
112 Morgan, above n 29, 103. 
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irradiation plants have been proposed and seeks to make piecemeal amendment 
to the Resource Management Act 1991, which provides an adequate framework 
for dealing with the problem through the public planning process. 
If opposition parties take the initiative in putting forward legislative proposals, 
those proposals will have a greater chance than previously of being enacted for 
two main reasons. First, it is less likely that the Government will be able to 
control sufficient numbers in the House to defeat it. 113 
Second, members' Bills will no longer be automatically ruled out of order if 
they involve government expenditure or the imposition of taxation. How great 
this change is remains to be seen as the government still has the power to veto a 
member' s Bill if it has a greater than minor impact on its fiscal aggregates. What 
is a greater than minor impact is a matter for the Government to determine, 
however, it must state "with some particularity the nature of the impact" and 
provide a certificate giving its reasons for not agreeing to the Bill. What 
reasons will be considered adequate and the level of impact which is greater 
than minor are as yet unclear as the veto power has yet to be tested. The very 
existence of the veto power may be an incentive for the Government to 
negotiate since the decision to use or not use it in a particular situation could 
precipitate a financial or confidence crisis. 
Overall, it seems likely that there will be an increase in the number of members' 
Bills enacted but this may not be a significant number. 
B Government Bills 
New Zealand has progressively become a more and more legislated for 
environment, earning the New Zealand Parliament the reputation of being "the 
fastest lawmaker in the West" .114 The Legislation Advisory Committee' s 
injunction that one of the checks involved in deciding to legislate is answering 
113 See above n 109. 
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'
1 Palmer, above n 67,139. 
the question - is legislation necessary? - appears to be ignored. 
115 Skene notes, 
among a number of deficiencies of the House, that it has "a penchant for making 
too many laws many of which are prepared in haste". 
116 Part of the reason for 
this is that it is too easy to make laws in New Zealand. There are no 
constitutional constraints on what laws may be enacted in New Zealand, in 
contrast with the United States where the Courts may strike down legislation 
which is inconsistent with the Constitution; and there is no second chamber in 
New Zealand to act as a check on a Parliament which has been dominated by 
the Executive. 
Palmer comments117 
There is one school of thought which says that our fast law-making procedures 
allow our laws to be kept up to date easily and encourage a flexible approach. 
The other view is that the speed and simplicity of our legislative procedures 
make it too easy for the executive branch of government to do what it likes, to 
take power that it does not really need and smother us all in red tape. Both 
views contain important elements of truth. It is all a question of balance. 
It has been suggested that stronger select committees would mean a slower 
legislative process and therefore that less legislation would be enacted. 
Certainly, it appears that MMP will slow the legislative process; a negotiated 
process inevitably being slower than an imposed process. A slower process is 
likely to result in better quality legislation, at least in terms of the legislation 
achieving its object. New Zealand's Parliamentary Counsel are under constant 
pressure to draft complex measures in too short a space of time. 
Legislation may not be held up in select committee for very long because of the 
six month report back requirement for Bills. Much legislation takes a lot longer 
115 Legislation Advisory Committee Legislative Change: Guidelines on Process and Content, Report No 6 
(Wellington, 1991) 6. 
116 Skene, above 11 98, 247. 
117 Palmer, above 11 67, 147-1 48 . 
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than six months for submissions to be sought, heard, considered and for the 
committee to deliberate. Where six months is insufficient, the committee may 
make a special report seeking an extension and providing reasons for that 
request. Clearly there are some pieces of legislation which could not be 
addressed adequately within a six month period.118 Where complex legislation, 
which is not opposed by any party, requires longer than six months, it is 
probable that a extension of time would be granted. 119 
There may well be less government-initiated legislation, where the government 
is a minority or where, as at present, the main government party can not be sure 
of the support of its coalition partner on any but a narrow range of measures. 
However, most legislation introduced by the government is not contentious in a 
party political sense and therefore is unlikely to be opposed for other than 
tactical reasons. It appears more likely that the government will introduce less 
politically contentious legislation, which probably means less major reform. 
Indeed, 1996 has been a year of very little contentious legislation. Palmer 
suggests that the government has managed its legislative programme to avoid 
confrontation with opposition parties and that "[ w ]here it strikes obstacles it 
doesn't introduce the bills" .120 Even where the government is a minority or 
unsure of its supporters, it may still succeed with its legislative programme 
where the opposition parties are divided and unable to combine to oppose 
effectively. 
Governments may confine themselves to housekeeping legislation. Measures 
proposing major reform may be left to the initiative of opposition parties. 
However, it may be that the Government will choose to adopt members' Bills 
which have proven popular, have the policy and financial implications more 
rigorously analysed than is usual for members' Bills so that the measures can be 
11 8 Two recent examples being the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 and the Fisheries 
Act 1996. 
11 9 On 27 August 1996, the House granted leave to extend the reporting date to 30 July 1997 for 12 Bills 
before select committees. 
120 Palmer, above n 6, 7. 
accommodated in the government's financial policies. 121 It may, of course, not 
suit the opposition member to allow the Government to adopt his or her Bill, if 
it has sufficient support in Parliament to be passed anyway. 
If the government were to leave the legislative initiative to opposition parties, 
this could have potentially serious repercussions for New Zealand's financial 
stability as members' legislation is generally not co-ordinated and members do 
not have sufficient information and advice to be able to integrate their proposals 
with the government's. A flood of such legislation could prompt the 
government into using its financial veto which could produce a situation where 
a confidence vote is proposed. Such a situation could be very dangerous for the 
government. One way of dealing with such a possibility is to establish a formal 
pre-legislative stage in which committees could scrutinise all legislation. 
Much will depend on the type of government that is in power and the trends 
that develop in consensus. 
C Circumventing the House 
It has been suggested that, where a government does not have sufficient 
numbers in the House or on committees to ensure the passage of its legislative 
measures and if it meets too much opposition, it may resort to non-legislative 
mechanisms to achieve its objectives, that is, it may circumvent and thereby 
marginalise Parliament. 
There are many examples from the past of governments legislating to achieve a 
policy objective which could have been achieved in some other way, although 
legislation may on occasions have been the fastest way of achieving that 
outcome. For example, the government does not need to pass legislation in 
order to set up a government Ministry or Department. It is within the 
121 Standing Order 262. 
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prerogative powers of the Crown to do so and such a policy may be 
implemented by Cabinet minute, as was the case with the Government Printing 
Office. However, a trend developed for the establishment of Ministries and 
Departments by legislation, eg the Ministry of Works and Development, the 
Department of Trade and Industry. Legislation is also necessary to disestablish 
entities set up by legislation. Recent governments have returned to the practice 
of setting up _Crown entities without legislation, which provides the government 
with greater scope to restructure or disestablish the entities without the need to 
go to Parliament. 
The government may try to make greater use of subordinate legislation as a 
mechanism to avoid select committee scrutiny of its proposals. Before it can 
use subordinate legislation, however, there must be a regulation-making power 
contained in a piece of legislation. Regulation-making power will have been and, 
in the future, will continue to go through the legislative process and be 
scrutinised in select committee to ensure that it is a proper power to be 
delegated to the Executive and that the policy it represents is in accordance with 
the purposes of the Act. The advantage of using subordinate legislation is that 
the Government only needs to guide the regulation-making provision through 
Parliament once, and it may make use of the power on many occasions. 
However, a maJor impediment to the government of the day abusing its 
regulation-making power is the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989. Section 
4 of that Act requires all regulations to be laid before the House by the sixteenth 
day after the regulations were made, and the House, by resolution, may disallow 
any regulations or any provisions of any regulations. 122 Alternatively, the House 
may, again by resolution, amend, or revoke and substitute any regulations .123 
The Regulations Review Committee is also a powerful tool in preventing the 
abuse by Government of its regulation-making power. It examines all 
regulations and may consider draft regulations referred to it by a Minister. It 
122 Section 5(1) Regulations (Disallowancc) Act 1989. 
123 Section 9 Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989. 
may also consider a regulation-making power in a Bill before another committee 
and report on it to that committee, and consider any other matter relating to 
regulations and report on it to the House. 124 Standing Order 196 sets out a 
number of grounds upon which the committee may draw the attention of the 
House to a regulation. One of those grounds is that the regulation "contains 
• c-. 1· ,, 125 matter more appropriate 1or par 1amentary enactment . 
The Government will have to continue to come to Parliament for supply and 
taxation as a minimum. However, where the Government has managed to 
negotiate a coalition or other agreement in order to govern, it is likely that the 
least such agreements will provide to the Government is the assurance that the 
members of those other parties will vote with the Government on confidence 
matters. In order to lessen its vulnerability on confidence matters, the 
Government is likely to be more selective as to how it defines such matters. 
124 Standing Order 195. 
125 Standing Order l 96(2)(f) . 
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VIII PREREQUISITES FOR EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION 
BY OPPOSITION PARTIES 
Opposition parties will need to take the opportunities which present themselves 
for their individual members to develop areas of expertise so that the work load 
can be shared around. Party experts should then be able to brief their caucuses 
on new legislative proposals and agree a position on them, so that all members 
have at least some understanding of the repercussions of a measure before the 
second reading debate. Only interested and knowledgeable members are likely 
to turn up to speak at debates, since there is no longer a requirement for a 
quorum in the House, and because of the provision for proxy voting. 
Opposition parties will need to consider on which committees they might most 
usefully place their members and lobby for those appointments in the Business 
Committee and in the House. Few parties are likely to be able to cover all 
committees adequately and they will need to be selective. Here too strategic 
alliances will be important, as there will be little value in swamping one 
committee with like-minded members from different parties if it means leaving 
other committees without adequate representation. 
The move to consensus decision-making is to the advantage of opposition 
parties as, under First Past the Post, and prior to the enactment of the Official 
Information Act 1982, the lack of information effectively shut them out of 
power unless and until their party became the Government. When that 
happened the new Government would then exclude the former Government 
from involvement. The Official Information Act addressed the Opposition's lack 
of information to some extent, although it took some years before the public 
service bureaucracy adjusted to the principle of making official information 
freely available, as that represented a complete reversal of the Official Secrets 
Act philosophy. 
MMP will encourage the trend towards open government, as governments 
realise that they need to share information in order to negotiate support among 
other parties. As a result there are likely to be more opportunities for 
opposition parties to obtain information and to be briefed by departmental 
officials. Opposition parties will need advisers and researchers in order to digest 
the greater amount of information and then to participate effectively. 
In the past the government's pre-eminent position in controlling the legislative 
process was protected by its control of information. Information-sharing 
promotes negotiation and consensus decision-making whereas a refusal to share 
information is counter-productive in that it alienates potential contributors to 
the debate. Access to relevant and complete information on an issue is a 
prerequisite to meaningful negotiation and increases the chances of achieving 
consensus. 
Even if the government was not willing to share information with opposition 
parties, the more parties that are represented in Cabinet, the more likely it is that 
Cabinet will leak. However, the current Cabinet, which contains one United 
Party member, has not been particularly plagued with leaks of information. The 
sole United Party member in Cabinet, Peter Dunne, has been at pains to ensure 
that he gives no cause for complaint in that respect. 
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However, there is the danger that Cabinet representatives of junior coalition 
, 
partners could see some benefit for their parties in selective leaking of Cabinet 
discussions and decisions, especially where the cabinet decisions had gone 
against the junior partner's electoral commitments. This could put serious strain 
on the doctrine of collective responsibility and provide a greater incentive for 
the party forming the government to find an "ideologically congenial" coalition 
partner. A strengthening of individual ministerial responsibility under MMP 
could also cause parties to look for coalition partners with compatible 
policies. 127 On the other hand, David Bradshaw suggests that collective 
126 The Independent, 10 May 1996, 19. 
127 Strnmetal,aboven20,313. 
51 
52 
responsibility may be strengthened by the "pressures of wanting to make the 
coalition work, in order to remain in Government". He stressed that for 
collective responsibility to work effectively "there will have to be good 
information flows between the coalition partners if mutual trust is to be 
maintained". 128 
128 MlvfP Newsletter f or Chief Executives August 1994. 
IX CONCLUSION 
Opposition parties cannot help but exert influence over the legislative process in 
an MMP environment where minority and/or coalition government is likely. 
These opportunities have always been there to some extent, but will be 
enhanced where the government is in a minority or part of a coalition, as it will 
not be in a position to insist on the enactment of its measures, and parties will 
be represented on committees according to their size. Proportionality works to 
the advantage of opposition parties only so long as the government does not 
control a majority. 
Under MMP, there will be greater incentive for opposition members to take a 
more active interest in their parliamentary functions and duties as opposed to 
their political functions and duties, as they will no longer be able to justify 
inaction by reference to the futility of their involvement. There is a greater 
chance of their views being taken into account and actually making a difference. 
The most important forum for opposition parties to exercise their influence will 
be the select committee, where the detailed scrutiny of Bills which is undertaken 
can significantly modify a Bill. The contribution made by opposition parties will 
depend on them having developed expertise, targeted the committees where 
their expertise could be most usefully be deployed and having access , to 
adequate and timely information. 
Assuming minority government, the Standing Orders strengthen the 
representation of the opposition parties on select committees and ensure that all 
parties will be represented on committees not just the powerful two of the past. 
The select committees will be where the deals are negotiated between and 
among parties. 
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Although the strongest committees tend to be associated with the lowest level 
of party control, this is not necessarily what will happen in New Zealand with its 
own unique political culture. Under MMP, select committees are likely to 
become stronger and caucuses will continue to have a role in the legislative 
process, although what form this role may take cannot be predicted with any 
confidence. It may be that instead of caucus influencing its members on a 
committee, its select committee members, as party experts, may influence 
caucus and the party attitude to certain policy and legislative proposals. Some 
party discipline will probably need to be maintained in order to ensure that the 
deals done in select committee and coalition agreements can be honoured. 
Individual members may have a large degree of independence in how they 
approach many issues, but there may be a small number of issues upon which 
some parties demand adherence to the party line. The increased independence of 
members is likely to flow on to increase the independence of select committees, 
allowing some degree of committee loyalty to develop. If there is less 
contentious legislation introduced there will also be fewer measures upon which 
members will be required to produce a certain outcome and therefore more 
opportunities for independence and committee loyalty to develop. 
The legislative process may slow down and produce less legislation providing 
greater opportunities for opposition parties to have input and improve the 
quality of the legislation that is enacted. 
The arguments for involving select committees in the finalising of policy and the 
drafting of Bills may become more persuasive, especially if there is a greater 
number of members' Bills proposed and likely to be enacted, and draft Bills may 
be referred to select committees twice. Pre-introduction referral would have the 
advantage of allowing the Government to tap into the collective wisdom of a 
group of members who will develop expertise in the policy area addressed by 
the Bill. This may appear to slow the legislative process further but that would 
probably be beneficial as the deal-making between Government and opposition 
parties could be undertaken at an earlier stage and less Parliamentary time spent 
on legislation that is not likely to proceed. 
As there will be a real possibility of the Government being thwarted in its 
legislative programme, it may tum to other means to try and avoid the need to 
come to Parliament for legislation. This may be a good thing, as New Zealand 
has a reputation for legislating where it may not be necessary. 
The mechanisms that the Government can employ without Parliament's sanction 
are limited to those which have developed over many years as prerogative 
powers, and to subordinate legislation. Those mechanisms have their own 
safeguards. Overall, the Government's requirement for mechanisms which do 
not involve legislation may be a benefit rather than a drawback of 11:MP and the 
new Standing Orders. 
It is likely that there will be less contentious legislation introduced by the 
government and possibly less legislation overall, leaving the legislative field 
open to the opposition parties to become the initiators of legislation, and while 
the Standing Orders constrain the introduction of members' Bills, these rules are 
not immutable . 
It will continue to be necessary for the Government to ensure that necessary but 
non-contentious housekeeping legislation is enacted as well as the all-important 
budget legislation (Imprest Supply and Appropriation Bills). 
As it is unlikely that the Government will be able to enact whatever legislation it 
pleases, it may become more careful in characterising proposals as confidence 
matters. We are likely to see a return to the situation where the Executive 
proposes its legislative programme but must rely on Parliament to determine 
what measures will proceed to enactment and in what form. 
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APPENDIX 
Comparison of legislative process before and after adoption of the new Standing Orders 
Bill introduced 
First Reading -
Debate on first reading may take place inunediately 
following introduction, although some members would not 
have seen a copy of the Bill. 
Referred to select committee -
for hearing of public submissions and consideration. An 
instruction to the committee may extend or restrict its order 
of reference and the committee may consider only those 
matters referred. No time limit imposed on select committee 
to report Bill back to the House. 
Bill reported back to the House -
with recommendations for change. One hour debate on 
motion to table the committee's report follows. 
Second Reading -
Bill is set down for second reading on next sitting day 
following presentation of select committee report. 
Generally, the only amendment that could be moved was 
one to delay the second reading. Main debate. 
Committee of the Whole House -
Bill is committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
next sitting day. Clause by clause, or part by part 
consideration of the Bill by, the whole House in committee. 
Anlendments may be made by Supplementary Order Paper 
(SOP). This stage could be dispensed with only with the 
leave of the House if there were no amendments to be 
moved. 
Third Reading-
Following adoption of the report on the Bill, it is set down 
for third reading on the next sitting day following. 
Royal Assent -
endorsed by the Governor-General. 
Unless otherwise specified in the Act, it takes effect from 
the date of Ro al Assent. 
Bill introduced and read a first time with no debate on 
first reading, but a copy of the Bill should be available to 
each member before the first reading.* 
Second Reading -
which addresses the purpose and principles of the Bill and 
effectively sets the tern1s of reference for consideration by 
the select committee. May take place no sooner than the 3rd 
sitting day following introduction. 
Referred to select committee -
for hearing of public submissions and consideration. 
Committee examines the Bill to determine whether it 
should be passed in the form in which it has been 
introduced and may recommend amendments consistent 
with the principles and objects of the Bill. Bill must be 
reported back to the House within 6 months unless the 
House approves an extension. 
Presentation of select committee report -
The debate on the report is set down on the third sitting day 
following. Anlendments made unanimously by the 
committee are adopted as part of the Bill when the House 
agrees that the Bill should proceed. Those recommended by 
a majority of the committee must be agreed to by the House 
before being adopted as part of the Bill. 
Committee of the Whole House -
Clause by clause, or part by part consideration of the Bill, 
amendments by SOP. 
This stage may be dispensed with by detemlination of the 
Business Committee. 
Third Reading -
Following adoption of the report on the Bill, it is set down 
for third reading on the next sitting day following. 
Royal Assent -
endorsed by the Governor-General. 
Unless otherwise specified in the Act, it takes effect from 
the date of Royal Assent. 
* Under the new Standing Orders some Bills, subject to the agreement of the Business Conunittee, may be introduced 
during an adjournment. Such Bills are considered to have been read a first time on the date of the Business Conunittee 's 
agreement and automatically referred to a select committee. They have their second reading follO\vi.ng consideration of tl1e 
select committee's report. 
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